Shiba Inu’s Shibarium Bridge Could Be Linked to $2.4M Flash Loan Attack; 10 of 12 Validators Possibly Compromised

• Flash-loan bridge exploit drained 224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB

• 10 of 12 validator signing keys were compromised; only two validators refused a malicious state

• Developers paused staking, moved funds to a 6-of-9 hardware multisig, and engaged Hexens, Seal911, and PeckShield

Shibarium bridge hack: $2.4M drained in a flash loan exploit; read immediate impact on SHIB/BONE and the containment steps taken by developers.

What happened in the Shibarium bridge hack?

Shibarium bridge hack describes a flash loan-style exploit on 13 September that used borrowed liquidity to seize validator influence, allowing an attacker to sign a fraudulent state and drain 224.57 ETH and ~92.6 billion SHIB. Developers immediately paused sensitive functions and began a forensic response.

How did the attacker manipulate validator voting power?

The attacker executed a rapid flash loan, used the borrowed funds to buy 4.6 million BONE tokens within a single block, and obtained the necessary voting weight to produce a malicious state.

That temporary two-thirds majority depended on the loan-funded purchase; without it, the attacker could not have forged consensus.

Details of the exploit

The attacker leveraged bridge funds and a flash-loan technique to momentarily control voting weight on Shibarium’s Layer 2 consensus.

Within one block they purchased 4.6 million BONE, signed a malicious state, and repaid the flash loan after extracting assets from the bridge: specifically 224.57 ETH and ~92.6 billion SHIB.

The plot twist: validator compromise and token handling

Although funds were siphoned, BONE tokens used in the attack remain locked because validators retain custody of those tokens, limiting immediate liquidation.

Forensic review indicates 10 of 12 validator signing keys were compromised; only K9 Finance and UnificationUND refused to sign the fraudulent state.

The attacker also tried to liquidate about $700,000 in KNINE tokens, but the K9 Finance DAO blocked the attempt. Other tokens (LEASH, ROAR, TREAT, BAD, SHIFU) were not drained.

Steps taken by Shibarium’s developers

Shibarium’s developers paused staking and unstaking to prevent further exploit vectors.

They moved funds from proxy contracts into a secured 6-of-9 hardware multisig wallet to reduce single-point-of-failure risk.

External blockchain security firms Hexens, Seal911, and PeckShield were engaged for a full forensic audit. Developers also began securing validator key transfers and coordinating asset freezes on attacker-linked wallets.

Impact on BONE and SHIB — comparison table

How are investigators and the community responding?

Investigators are tracing on-chain movements and coordinating with the community to freeze attacker-linked wallets where possible.

Developers are confirming validator key integrity, implementing additional key-transfer safeguards, and preparing further hardening steps for Shibarium’s bridge logic and multisig controls.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the attack method used in the Shibarium exploit?

The attacker used a flash-loan-style operation to temporarily buy validator-weighting tokens (BONE), sign a fraudulent state, extract bridge assets, and then repay the loan within the same block.

Can stolen SHIB and ETH be recovered?

Recovery depends on on-chain tracing, cooperation from exchanges and custodians, and whether attacker wallets are frozen. Developers are coordinating with partners and security firms, but recovery is not guaranteed.

Key Takeaways

• Immediate loss: ~224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB (~$2.4M) were drained from the Shibarium bridge.
• Root cause: Flash-loan purchase of 4.6M BONE granted temporary voting control; 10 of 12 validator keys were compromised.
• Response: Staking paused, funds moved to a 6-of-9 hardware multisig, and Hexens, Seal911, and PeckShield were engaged for a full forensic review.

Conclusion

The Shibarium bridge hack exposed a critical consensus and bridge vulnerability that allowed a flash-loan-powered vote manipulation to drain funds. COINOTAG will monitor developer updates, forensic findings, and community remediation as teams work to restore security and investor confidence.

Published: 2025-09-14. Updated: 2025-09-14.