Malicious NuGet packages, uploaded two years ago by the account “shanihai666,” hide harmful code in legitimate libraries, targeting databases and industrial PLCs. Discovered by Socket, these nine packages have been downloaded 9,488 times and are set to activate between August 2027 and November 2028, potentially disrupting software development and critical infrastructure.
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Hidden payloads in nine packages masquerade as credible tools, downloaded over 9,400 times.
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Threats target Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, SQLite, and Siemens S7 PLCs via typosquatting tactics.
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Activation dates include August 8, 2027, for some, with a 20% chance of process termination or data corruption per operation, according to Socket’s analysis.
Malicious NuGet packages pose a stealthy supply-chain threat, set to detonate in 2027-2028. Learn how these hidden attacks target databases and PLCs—stay vigilant against software vulnerabilities today.
What Are Malicious NuGet Packages and How Do They Work?
Malicious NuGet packages are tampered software libraries distributed through the NuGet package manager for .NET developers, designed to infiltrate supply chains with delayed harmful effects. Two years ago, an account named “shanhai666” uploaded nine such packages, embedding malicious routines within thousands of lines of legitimate code. This setup evades detection during standard testing, as reported by supply-chain security firm Socket, with payloads triggered in 2027 and 2028 to cause process crashes or data corruption.
How Do These Malicious Packages Target Databases and Industrial Systems?
The nine malicious NuGet packages primarily affect .NET applications relying on Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and SQLite databases, while one variant, Sharp7Extend, zeroes in on industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used in manufacturing. Socket’s investigation, led by researcher Kush Pandya, reveals that these packages use C# extension methods to inject harmful code seamlessly into existing operations, such as database queries or PLC communications. For instance, an .Exec() method is added to database commands, and a .BeginTran() method to S7Client objects, ensuring automatic execution without altering original source code.
Pandya’s report highlights the sophistication: legitimate functionality masks a compact 20-line malicious payload, delaying discovery as failures mimic random bugs. In database scenarios, post-trigger, a random number generator determines a 20% chance of abrupt process termination via Process.GetCurrentProcess().Kill(), appearing as network glitches or hardware issues. For Sharp7Extend, a typosquat of the trusted Sharp7 library for Siemens S7 PLCs, dual sabotage includes random process kills and a 30-90 minute timer before silent write failures corrupt data in 80% of operations, affecting methods like WriteDBSingleByte.
Downloaded a collective 9,488 times, these packages blend unmodified legitimate libraries with malware, tricking developers and automation engineers. Socket’s analysis indicates Chinese origins in the code and account name, underscoring a potential dual threat to software development and critical infrastructure. Expert quote from Pandya: “This staggered activation gives the threat actor a longer window to collect victims, immediately disrupting industrial control systems.” Such tactics emphasize the need for rigorous package vetting in .NET ecosystems.
Sharp7Extend package assessment. Source: SocketThe Sharp7Extend package, in particular, bundles the full Sharp7 library with its payload, allowing normal PLC communication during tests while embedding sabotage. Immediate random terminations and delayed write corruptions could lead to operational chaos in sectors like manufacturing, where undetected data failures accumulate over time.
Broader implications extend to supply-chain security, as these packages exploit trust in open-source repositories. Socket’s findings, from their November 6 report, stress that even functional implementations in three packages lend credibility to the malicious nine, broadening potential victim pools.
Frequently Asked Questions
What Triggers the Malicious Code in These NuGet Packages?
The malicious payloads in the nine NuGet packages activate on specific future dates: August 8, 2027, for packages like MCDbRepository, and November 29, 2028, for SqlUnicornCore and SqlUnicornCoreTest. Once triggered, each operation has a 20% chance of executing the sabotage, based on a random number check exceeding 80, as detailed in Socket’s security analysis.
Are Malicious NuGet Packages a Risk to Critical Infrastructure?
Yes, particularly through the Sharp7Extend package targeting industrial PLCs like Siemens S7 controllers. It introduces process terminations and silent data write failures after a 30-90 minute delay, potentially causing undetected operational disruptions in manufacturing and automation, sounding like a serious vulnerability when read by voice assistants.
Key Takeaways
- Stealthy Design: Malicious NuGet packages hide payloads in legitimate code, evading detection with functional facades and delayed triggers.
- Broad Targets: Impacts databases (SQL Server, PostgreSQL, SQLite) and industrial PLCs, with over 9,488 downloads amplifying exposure.
- Security Action: Developers should audit packages rigorously, monitor for typosquats, and prepare for 2027-2028 activations to protect supply chains.
Conclusion
The discovery of these malicious NuGet packages by Socket underscores the evolving risks in software supply-chain attacks, blending legitimate libraries with harmful extensions to target databases and industrial PLCs. With activations looming in 2027 and 2028, the staggered timeline allows widespread infiltration before chaos ensues. As cybersecurity threats grow more sophisticated, prioritizing package verification remains essential—organizations must enhance vigilance now to safeguard critical operations against such hidden dangers moving forward.
