WLFI token theft is a phishing-driven exploit that leverages Ethereum’s EIP-7702 delegate feature to pre-plant a malicious delegate contract in compromised wallets; when tokens arrive, attacker-controlled execution and automated sweeper bots drain newly received WLFI quickly.
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Immediate cause: private key leakage enabling EIP-7702 delegate pre-plants.
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Attackers use batched delegate execution to auto-sweep tokens as soon as they appear.
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Incidents reported across WLFI whitelist wallets; expert comment from SlowMist founder Yu Xian included.
WLFI token theft: EIP-7702 phishing exploit drains wallets — learn how it works and how to secure holdings. Read steps to respond now.
World Liberty Financial token holders are reportedly being drained of their WLFI tokens. One security expert points to a phishing exploit tied to Ethereum contracts.
Summary: World Liberty Financial’s (WLFI) governance tokenholders are being hit with a known phishing wallet exploit tied to Ethereum’s EIP-7702 upgrade, according to security researcher Yu Xian. Reports indicate automated sweeper bots and malicious delegate contracts are draining WLFI from compromised whitelist wallets.
What is WLFI token theft?
WLFI token theft refers to incidents where World Liberty Financial governance tokens are stolen from user wallets after attackers exploit private key leaks and EIP-7702 delegate mechanics. Victims report tokens being swept immediately when deposited, often before owners can react.
How does the EIP-7702 phishing exploit work?
EIP-7702 allows externally owned accounts to temporarily delegate execution rights to a contract, enabling batch transactions. Attackers who obtain a private key can pre-install a malicious delegate contract that triggers automated sweeps when tokens arrive. Security researcher Yu Xian (SlowMist) describes this as a “Classic EIP-7702 phishing exploit” requiring prior key exposure.
Reported sequence of events:
- Private key is compromised (commonly via phishing).
- Attacker deploys or pre-plants a delegate contract tied to the victim address.
- Victim receives WLFI tokens or sends ETH for gas; delegate contract executors instantly transfer assets to attacker-controlled addresses.
When did WLFI token theft incidents surface?
Reports began surfacing at launch, with users on Aug. 31 and afterward describing rapid drains when WLFI tokens were received. The WLFI token launched with a 24.66 billion total supply and immediate trading, creating a high-volume environment that amplified sweeper-bot effectiveness.
What are users reporting in WLFI forums?
Forum users describe racing to move tokens out, sometimes salvaging only a fraction. One user said they moved 20% of holdings while 80% remained in a compromised wallet. Another noted the whitelist presale requirement forced use of the same wallet, increasing exposure risk.
How can WLFI holders respond and secure wallets?
Security steps front-load immediate protection: move remaining funds to a new wallet with a fresh private key, revoke unknown approvals, and avoid sending ETH for gas from compromised addresses. Yu Xian recommends cancelling or replacing ambushed EIP-7702 delegates where possible.
Practical steps to reduce risk
- Revoke approvals: Use trusted wallet tools (locally) to revoke unrecognized contract approvals.
- Transfer funds: Move assets to a newly generated wallet before interacting with untrusted contracts.
- Check for pre-plants: Inspect wallet for unexpected delegate contracts and remove if possible.
- Report and document: Log transaction IDs and timestamps; report to official WLFI support channels (email only, per WLFI team notice).
Frequently Asked Questions
How can I tell if my wallet has a malicious delegate contract?
Check recent transactions and contract approvals for unfamiliar addresses or delegate calls. Look for pre-planted contract addresses with execution rights that you did not authorize. If found, treat the wallet as compromised and avoid sending transactions from it.
What immediate actions should I take if my WLFI tokens are at risk?
Do not initiate transfers from the suspected wallet. Create a new wallet, revoke approvals if possible, and transfer any salvageable assets via safe, minimal test transactions. Document transactions and contact official WLFI email support only.
Key Takeaways
- Exploit vector: EIP-7702 delegate mechanics can be abused when private keys leak.
- User impact: WLFI whitelist wallets have been targeted; rapid automated sweeps drain tokens.
- Action: Revoke approvals, create new wallets, and follow security best practices immediately.
Conclusion
This WLFI token theft story underscores how private key compromise combined with EIP-7702 delegate features enables automated drains. Prioritize revoking approvals, moving funds to fresh wallets, and following official WLFI support channels. COINOTAG will update this report as verified developments and official statements emerge.
