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Blockstream's 131-Page Security Review Targets Bitcoin (BTC) Post-Quantum SHRINCS

Blockstream researchers published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a post-quantum signature proposal for Bitcoin (BTC), and want community review.

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November 21, 2026, 02:54 AM UTC5 min read
AI SummaryAI
  • Blockstream researchers released a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, dated Nov. 18
  • The paper estimates SHRINCS classical security at 121.4 to 122.7 bits, resting on three unproven conjectures
  • Stateful SHRINCS signatures run 548 to 4,619 bytes; the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes
  • Bitcoin's current Schnorr signatures measure 64 bytes, roughly 90 times smaller than SHRINCS' stateless fallback

Blockstream’s 131-Page Proof Audit

Blockstream researchers have published the first version of a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin (BTC), and they are asking the wider community to look for flaws in it. The paper, dated Nov. 18, reduces the scheme’s security to the properties of its underlying hash function, the property the whole proof stands on. Researcher Mikhail Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography specialist at Blockstream, announced the release on Thursday in a thread on X, framing it explicitly as unfinished work. Its estimates for classical security run from 121.4 to 122.7 bits, figures that rest on assumptions including three unproven conjectures. The figure is provisional by design: every bound depends on conjectures the team has not proven. Kudinov said the team is still working on a new analysis of a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has so far been conjectured, alongside efforts to tighten a reprogramming step and improve a bound against quantum attackers. Two side results reach beyond SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability, both of which the researchers say also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the hash-based schemes SHRINCS borrows from. The market context sits apart: the Bitcoin price slipped about 6% over the past 24 hours, a move the paper does not address. Kudinov wrote that the analysis has not been sufficiently peer reviewed and asked readers to open an issue if they find an error. “We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes,” he wrote. The project’s GitHub repository carries the same caution, warning that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. The team wants errors surfaced now, while the scheme is still a draft.

548 to 5,777 Bytes Versus Schnorr’s 64

SHRINCS is hash-based, so its security rests on hash functions such as SHA-256, which the Bitcoin network already runs, rather than on the elliptic-curve math behind today’s signatures. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break that math by deriving a private key from a public key, the scenario the proposal targets. Per the researchers’ outline, SHRINCS places two designs under one key: a stateful part built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA. Because both use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the proof has to cover both. Size is the immediate cost. Under the draft Bitcoin (BTC) Improvement Proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes, roughly 90 times the 64-byte Schnorr signatures Bitcoin uses today and far above the roughly 71-byte ECDSA signatures still seen on chain. Signatures occupy scarce block space, the resource Segregated Witness reorganized, so larger signatures mean fewer transactions per block. The compact stateful path carries its own danger: it relies on one-time keys, and if a wallet reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal the funds, so wallet software has to track the state of every key. Blockstream’s director of research, Jonas Nick, said on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must switch to the stateless path automatically whenever a state counter could be compromised, for example during a restore. “It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” he said. “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.” Nick also flagged the economics: “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” he said, because fewer transactions fit into a block, which he argued changes the value proposition of Bitcoin (BTC). The draft BIP remains open for comment, and Kudinov asked for feedback from engineers, cryptographers and protocol developers, effectively leaving the DYOR burden with the community until independent review arrives. The work lands as quantum risk climbs the agenda: a global securities regulators’ group this week called moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography especially hard, and researchers recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network after Bitcoin’s first quantum-safe transaction was shown without a fork.

Read together, the publication and the open BIP draft amount to a claims audit, not a deployment decision. The 121.4 to 122.7-bit estimates stand on three unproven conjectures, and the project’s repository bars treating the documents as the sole basis for production use, so the current evidence supports no protocol change. The binding tradeoff is size: a 5,777-byte stateless signature against 64 bytes for Schnorr means fewer transactions per block, and Nick leaves the fee-market outcome open. For holders with a long HODL horizon the near-term touchpoints are the BIP comment period and wallet handling of stateful keys; beyond them, the analysis changes nothing until independent peer review starts.

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