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Fluidkey Blames Third-Party Logging Flaw for $1.58 Million Wallet Drain

Fluidkey ties its Nov. 19 drain of at least $1.58 million to a third-party logging flaw, as on-chain data traces the funds across six chains to Tornado Cash.

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November 21, 2026, 09:00 AM UTC4 min read
AI SummaryAI
  • Fluidkey blamed a third-party logging tool flaw for a Nov. 19 drain of at least $1.58 million.
  • Bitquery traced $1.58 million to attacker wallets on six chains, led by Base and Ethereum.
  • Base users lost about $837,000 and Ethereum users $660,000 during the 36-minute drain.
  • Six wallets deposited 881.6 ETH, about $1.57 million, into Tornado Cash after the theft.

Session Data Stolen Through a Logging Tool

Fluidkey blamed a flaw in a third-party logging tool for the November 19 drain that moved at least $1.58 million out of its users' accounts. In a statement posted on X on November 20, the privacy crypto wallet maker said the attacker exploited the flaw to obtain session data, prepared unauthorized transfers on its servers, and had them signed the moment a user opened the app. The private keys that control user funds never left users' devices, the company said. The fix arrived as version 1.79.22, which removes the ability to prepare transfers that way and adds further safeguards. Fluidkey pushed the build to bring its web, iOS and Android apps back online, and it blocks every older client: users must update in Settings before they can send funds again. The product's design matters to how the attack played out. Fluidkey gives every user a single payment name, and each payment to that name is routed to a fresh stealth wallet address, so no outside observer can total what one user holds. Every address is a Safe smart contract wallet, with the spending key generated by the user in the browser. New addresses carry no ETH for gas, so Fluidkey submits each transaction on the user's behalf and pays the fee through a relayer, operating what amounts to a hot wallet per chain. On November 19, that relayer paid out funds from user accounts on six chains. Fluidkey's documentation states that the spending and viewing keys remain on the user's client; key storage, however, is a separate question from how a server-prepared transfer came to be approved.

$1.58 Million Traced Across Six Chains

On-chain analysis by Bitquery, a blockchain data firm, traced at least $1.58 million to attacker-linked wallets on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon. The drain ran for 36 minutes on November 19, from 17:28 to 18:04 UTC, and half the attacker's take left within the first five minutes. Base users took the largest loss at roughly $837,000, followed by Ethereum at $660,000; the biggest single transfer was $415,783 in USDT from two Ethereum accounts. The $1.58 million figure is a floor. Bitquery excluded $65,000 whose receiving wallets it could not tie to the attacker, which would put maximum on-chain movement at $1.64 million, and a separate GitHub tracker logged close to $1.63 million across seven chains including suspect addresses. About $349,000 sent to wallets with existing transaction histories was classified separately, because it includes ordinary activity from before the drain began. Within the attack window, one user moved $277,000 to a wallet they had been using since 2024. The exit was fast. Between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC that evening, six wallets deposited 881.6 ETH, about $1.57 million at the prices then in effect, into Tornado Cash; the attacker's wallets had drawn their first ETH from the same mixer hours before the theft. Relayer telemetry had already flagged the incident on-chain: Ethereum and Base logged 174 relayer transactions in the attack hour, against fewer than 30 per hour on November 18 and the morning of November 19. Fluidkey advised users to avoid its website and app at 18:20 UTC and said all services went offline at 18:05 UTC, with no unauthorized transactions recorded since; SEAL 911 is assisting in tracing the funds. The mixer playbook is familiar: Predict.fun promised refunds in October after a drain it attributed to a third-party website, and the Drift Protocol exploiters also routed stolen money through Tornado Cash.

Signing Flow, Not Key Storage

The technical record points to the approval flow, not key custody, as the weak link. Security firm Coinspect reviewed the rebuilt frontend and found older clients could auto-sign server-approved transactions without cryptographically binding the transaction contents to the approval act. The new version applies EIP-712, which ties what gets signed to what the user actually approves, and Coinspect says this matches Fluidkey's account, though the firm has not confirmed in code how session data was exposed. A 2024 audit by Dedaub had warned that a compromised server could deliver malicious JavaScript to reach spending keys, but its scope covered the public TypeScript library and parts of the design, not the full system. Fluidkey has committed to contacting affected users individually and publishing a full post-mortem; no date has been given.

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