Bitcoin Core Fixes 10-Second Bitcoin (BTC) Node Stall in 30.5, 31.3
Bitcoin Core shipped 30.5 and 31.3 on November 20 to patch CVE-2026-117348, a bug that stalled vulnerable nodes for over 10 seconds per message.
AI SummaryAI
- Bitcoin Core released versions 30.5 and 31.3 on November 20 to fix CVE-2026-117348.
- Vulnerable nodes could stall for over 10 seconds per crafted inv message.
- Spiral's Project Loupe reported the flaw on July 8; Stutxo reported it independently on August 4.
- Affected versions span 29.0 to 29.5, 30.0 to 30.4 and 31.0 to 31.2.
Bitcoin Core Ships 30.5 and 31.3 With the Fix
Bitcoin (BTC) Core released versions 30.5 and 31.3 on Friday, November 20, closing a medium-severity denial-of-service flaw tracked as CVE-2026-117348. A node running an affected build that receives repeated orphan transaction notifications can stop handling blocks and transactions for more than 10 seconds per message. The security advisory went out the same day, and the correction had already been merged into the 30.x and 31.x branches on November 17. The flaw sits in the Bitcoin network's software layer, not in its consensus rules: no funds were at risk and the advisory records no exploitation. It concerns orphan transactions, the entries a node caches when a transaction arrives before the transaction it spends. The project rates the severity as medium and frames the risk as one of availability: a targeted node keeps its keys, its rule set and its balances intact. Affected builds are 29.0 through 29.5, 30.0 through 30.4 and 31.0 through 31.2. Version 32.1 already carried the correction, applied there on October 27, so only the two maintenance releases were needed this week. During a stall, the node processes nothing arriving from peers, which matters for operators running mining infrastructure and exchange backends on full nodes. The advisory classifies the bug as easily discoverable, which under the project's security policy means fixes and public notices ship as fast as possible for each maintained major version, without the longer embargo applied to other medium- and high-severity findings. Market data shows the Bitcoin price slipped 5.5% over the past 24 hours, a move the disclosure neither caused nor reversed; the patch concerns node uptime, not proof of work validation or the supply schedule.
Spiral's Project Loupe, an automated scanning effort led by developer Elias Rohrer, reported the issue on July 8. The tool pairs with different large language models and was built to help open-source
Bitcoin (BTC) projects surface vulnerabilities before attackers do. A second researcher, Stutxo, filed an independent report on August 4. Developer Gregory Sanders verified the finding and passed it to Bitcoin Core's security team, and the fix was merged into the development branch on August 6. From there it waited for the maintenance cycle, entering the 30.x and 31.x branches on November 17 and reaching users three days later. Both reports landed before any release carried a patch, and the advisory credits the AI scan as the source of the discovery. The bug sat in how vulnerable releases handle orphan transactions. Bitcoin Core caches such a transaction and decides whether to request its missing parents. An announcement message listing available transactions, called an inv message, can carry up to 50,000 entries. Vulnerable builds did not skip duplicate transaction identifiers inside one batch, so an attacker repeating the identifier of an orphan with thousands of missing parents forced the node to rerun an expensive lookup for every occurrence. That mechanism explains the stall figure: the work repeats per occurrence, not per message, so the cost scales with how many times the identifier appears, and each message can freeze a node for more than 10 seconds while blocks and transactions from peers queue unanswered. The patch makes each transaction in an announcement count once. One branch gets no relief. The project's lifecycle table shows 29.x left maintenance in October, and the advisory states no patch will follow for it. Operators still on a 29.x release must move to 30.5, 31.3 or 32.1 to clear the now-public risk, and staying on the final 29.x build does not do that.
29.x Operators Still Have to Move
The timeline shows the pipeline worked, slowly. Loupe found the bug in July, a human verified it within a month, and the code sat merged for three months before the coordinated release. That gap is disclosure practice, not response failure: the advisory follows the policy for easily discoverable issues, which trades fast publication against the longer embargo given to harder-to-find flaws. What remains open sits with operators, not developers. The fix reaches only maintained branches, and 29.x, retired in October, gets nothing. Anyone running a 29.x node now knows about a publicly documented flaw and still has to act on it, by upgrading rather than waiting for a build that will not come.
AI-generated, AI-reviewed, under COINOTAG editorial oversight.

