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Blockaid Flags Ongoing K3 Capital sBOLD Exploit Draining $3.43M

Blockaid says attackers drained $3.43M from K3 Capital's sBOLD vault across 34 Ethereum transactions, with a separate $454K Reental breach on Polygon.

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November 18, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC5 min read
AI SummaryAI
  • Attackers flash-loaned wstETH, self-liquidated a Liquity V2 trove and minted cheap sBOLD shares.
  • Reental lost roughly $454,000 across two transactions after an administrator upgraded its Polygon proxy contracts.
  • A May 2025 ChainSecurity audit found a high-severity collateral accounting issue, later marked corrected.
  • The 2025 audit listed two critical, three high-severity and eight medium-severity findings.

Blockaid Flags Two Live Exploits

Security firm Blockaid issued alerts on Wednesday, Nov. 18, flagging what it described as two ongoing blockchain exploits with roughly $3.88 million drained from smart contracts across Ethereum and Polygon, a network that settles separately from the Ethereum layer-1. The larger of the two incidents struck K3 Capital's sBOLD vault, where attackers withdrew approximately $3.43 million across about 34 transactions on the Ethereum network. In a warning posted to X, Blockaid laid out the mechanics: the attackers flash-loaned wrapped staked ether (wstETH), self-liquidated a Liquity V2 trove into the protocol's stability pools, minted cheap sBOLD shares, swapped the collateral and redeemed other depositors' BOLD at artificially low valuations. The firm also identified an Ethereum wallet associated with the attack, along with a helper address and an example of the transactions used to drain the vault. The $3.43 million figure was an approximation based on the flows Blockaid had traced when the alert went live. The sBOLD vault operates inside Liquity V2, a decentralized borrowing protocol that issues the BOLD stablecoin against Ethereum-based collateral. sBOLD itself is a third-party product developed and maintained by K3 Capital: depositors place BOLD into the vault and receive sBOLD shares representing a proportional interest in its assets, with returns drawn from borrower interest and from collateral acquired through liquidations. Liquity's documentation identifies K3 Capital as the operator of sBOLD and states that the protocol's core development team does not maintain the vault. The second incident, at real estate tokenization platform Reental, was far smaller but structurally different: the K3 Capital case turned on the manipulation of vault share valuations through liquidations, while the Reental loss followed an administrative upgrade to contracts holding stablecoins. The two targets share little beyond their timing: one is a yield vault built on a borrowing protocol, the other a tokenized real estate platform whose contracts hold stablecoins directly. Both attacks were still in progress when Blockaid disclosed them.

A 2025 Audit and the Reental Breach

A review of the vault's prior security work shows auditors had examined a similar category of vulnerability before sBOLD went live. In an audit dated May 19, 2025, ChainSecurity identified a high-severity accounting issue involving the treatment of collateral held by the vault: an earlier version of the software could undervalue vault shares following liquidations, potentially allowing malicious participants to extract funds belonging to existing depositors. ChainSecurity classified the finding as corrected after changes were introduced to account for collateral when valuing the vault, writing that “the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations has been mitigated.” That assessment listed two critical, three high-severity and eight medium-severity findings, all of them marked as fixed during the auditing process. A separate May 2025 assessment by Dedaub examined the risks tied to the vault's reliance on BOLD market liquidity and its ability to value the stablecoin accurately. Whether Wednesday's attack used the previously identified accounting weakness or an entirely separate flaw is not yet established. The Reental breach involved no liquidation mechanics. Blockaid reported that an administrator had used its private key to upgrade proxy contracts tied to the platform's USDT and USDC deposit tokens, commonly called aTokens, and introduced what it described as “a contract that lets anyone drain the underlying tokens.” Roughly $454,000 had been transferred out across two transactions when the firm disclosed the incident, and Blockaid identified one address connected to the exploit along with two affected smart contracts. Reental's platform allows investors to take part in real estate investments through tokenized loans and shares linked to properties in Spain and the United States. The two breaches land in a heavy month for DeFi security: an exploit of Kava Lend cost roughly $3.76 million at pre-attack valuations earlier this week, a Gnosis Safe wallet lost a reported $6.45 million on Nov. 16, and Curve Finance disclosed about $38,200 in stolen administrative revenue through 138 unauthorized trades on Nov. 10; a governance proposal to replace the vulnerable contract stays open until Nov. 20.

The on-chain evidence makes the scale of both thefts independently checkable: the attacker wallet, helper address and example transactions Blockaid published for the sBOLD drain can be traced on Ethereum, and the two Reental transfers are visible on Polygon. The losses sit inside a broader November run of security failures, one that also includes a separate hacker moving 60,000 Ethereum in five transfers. What the on-chain record does not yet contain is a post-mortem from either team. K3 Capital had not responded to inquiries at press time, and neither it nor Reental has published an incident report naming a root cause, so it remains unconfirmed whether the sBOLD exploit reused the accounting flaw ChainSecurity believed it had closed or found a new path into the same valuation logic. The drained funds have not been recovered, and neither team has said whether any DeFi insurance coverage would apply to depositors.

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