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Ethereum

Gonka AI Exploit Drains $1.06 Million via Bridge

An attacker compromised Gonka AI's Ethereum bridge, draining $884,800 in stablecoins and minting $172,000 in unbacked WGNK tokens.

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November 18, 2026, 09:51 PM UTC4 min read
AI SummaryAI
  • Gonka AI suffered an Ethereum bridge exploit on November 18, losing about $1.06 million.
  • The attacker withdrew $884,800 in USDT and USDC stablecoins from the bridge reserves.
  • $172,000 in Wrapped Gonka (WGNK) tokens were issued without any backing collateral.
  • The attacker changed the bridge's rotating BLS group key to control withdrawal authorization.

Stablecoins Drained and Unbacked WGNK Minted

Decentralized artificial intelligence network Gonka AI has lost approximately $1.06 million after an attacker compromised the bridge protocol connecting its native chain to the Ethereum network, draining stablecoins and minting wrapped tokens without the collateral required to back them. The outflows were first documented in an on-chain trace, which puts the loss at roughly $884,800 in Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) withdrawn from the bridge plus $172,000 in Wrapped Gonka (WGNK) tokens issued with no assets behind them. Blockchain security firm Blockaid flagged the same incident while it was still in progress, counting about $1.05 million siphoned across roughly five transactions at the time of its initial alert. The two tallies sit a small distance apart, a gap consistent with an attack that was live when the first alert fired. After the initial drain, the funds were pushed through Uniswap and other DeFi venues and moved across a series of wallets, a routing that has so far obscured where the money ultimately sits. That matters for recovery, because assets swapped and dispersed across self-custody addresses are far harder to pin down, a difficulty seen earlier when stolen funds moved in five transfers. Wrapped Gonka is the bridged representation of the network's native token, which is why unauthorized issuance of it is treated as creating value from nothing. The exploit came to light on November 18, and no final destination address has been identified in the data published so far, leaving both the recovered-amount question and the attacker's identity open.

The attack targeted the bridge that moves assets between Gonka AI's native chain and Ethereum, the same cross-chain plumbing that the network's DApp ecosystem relies on for wrapped tokens and stablecoin reserves. Per the project's own technical documentation, a withdrawal from Gonka to Ethereum must carry cryptographic signatures from the network's validator set, and those signatures are checked against a BLS group key that rotates with every network epoch. The attacker changed that epoch key. With the compromised key in place, the part of the bridge responsible for authorizing withdrawals answered to the attacker, who then drew down the stablecoin reserves and minted WGNK without locking the corresponding assets on the native chain. That mechanism explains both halves of the loss. The $884,800 in USDT and USDC is a direct drain of reserves held for cross-chain transfers, while the $172,000 in WGNK is synthetic supply created without backing. Unbacked wrapped tokens carry a risk that plain theft does not: they can enter circulation and trade as if fully collateralized until someone audits the backing, at which point holders discover the shortfall. Neither published tally captures any subsequent swaps, so the final split between stablecoins, wrapped tokens and converted assets is not yet settled from the record available. Following the flow through the public ledger is possible in principle, and readers can start from the basics of sending and reading transactions, though dispersed wallets and the Uniswap leg make a clean endpoint unlikely. The pattern also resembles another ongoing exploit Blockaid flagged on an Ethereum-based protocol, where draining continued after the first alert.

The documented boundary in this case is narrow but firm. On-chain evidence establishes that the bridge's rotating BLS key was turned, that $884,800 left in stablecoins and that $172,000 in WGNK appeared without backing, figures a monitor can point to transaction by transaction. What nobody has established is who carried the attack out, whether the unbacked WGNK has been sold into circulation, or whether the team has rotated the key and paused withdrawals. No post-mortem or remediation plan from the Gonka AI team appears in the record so far. Until one is published, the root cause rests on what the exploit path itself shows: a single rotating key standing between the validators' signatures and full control of what crosses the bridge.

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